This paper focuses on linear-quadratic (LQ for short) mean-field games described by forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs for short), in which the individual control region is postulated to be convex. The decentralized strategies and consistency condition are represented by a kind of coupled mean-field FBSDEs with projection operators. The well-posedness of consistency condition system is obtained using the monotonicity condition method. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium property is discussed as well.
Introduction
The control of stochastic multi-agent systems has attracted large attentions by many researchers. As well-known, the large population systems arise naturally in various different fields (e.g., biology, engineering, social science, economics and finance, operational research and management, etc.). Readers interested in this topic may refer [27, 28, 29, 30] for more details of their solid backgrounds and real applications. The agents (or players) in large population system are individually negligible but their collective behaviors will make some significant impact on all agents. This trait can be captured by the weakly-coupling structure in the individual dynamics and cost functionals through the state-average. The individual behaviors of all agents in micro-scale can make their mass effects in the macroscale.
As for the controlled large population system, it is intractable for a given agent to collect all agents due to the highly complex interactions among its colleagues. Consequently, the centralized controls, which are built upon the full information of all agents, are not implementable and not efficient in large population framework. Alternatively, it is more reasonable and effective to study the decentralized strategies which depend on the local information 1 only. The mean-field type stochastic control problem is of both great interest and importance in various fields such as science, engineering, economics, management, and particularly in financial investment. In contrast with the standard stochastic control problems, the underlying dynamic system and the cost functional involve state processes as well as their expected values (hence the name mean-field). In financial investment, however, one frequently encounters interesting problems which are closely related to money managers' performance evaluation and incentive compensation mechanisms. Together with MF-FSDEs, research is naturally required on optimal control problems based on meanfield forward-backward stochastic differential equations (hereafter MF-FBSDEs). Hence, one powerful tool employed is so-called mean-field games (see [35] ). The basic idea is to approximate the initial large population control problem by its limiting problem via some mean-field term (i.e., the asymptotic limit of state-average). There are huge literature can be found in [3, 11, 12, 13, 18, 31, 34, 35] for the study of mean-field games; [29] for cooperative social optimization; [27] , [36] and [37] and references therein for models with a major player; [1, 4, 46] for optimal control with a mean term in the dynamics and cost, etc.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the forward backward mean-field LQG of large population systems for which the individual states follow some forward backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs in short). This framework makes our setting very different to existing works of mean-field LQG games wherein the individual states evolve by some forward stochastic differential equations. In contrast to classical stochastic differential equations, the terminal condition of BSDE should be specified as the priori random variable, which means, the BSDE will admit one pair of adapted solutions, in which the second solution component (the diffusion term) is naturally appeared here by virtue of the martingale representation theorem and the adaptiveness requirement for filtration. The linear BSDEs are first introduced in [2] for studying the optimal control problems, and the general nonlinear BSDEs are developed by Pardoux and Peng in 1992 [38] . Since then, the study of BSDE has initiated consistent and intense discussions, moreover, it has been used in many applications of diverse areas. For instance, the BSDE takes very important role to characterize the nonlinear expectation (g-expectation, see [40] ), or the stochastic differential recursive utility (see [14] ). Subsequently, El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez [32] presents many applications of BSDE in mathematical finance and optimal control theory. Pardoux and Peng establish a kind of stochastic partial differential equations with backward doubly SDE (see [39] ). Therefore, it is very natural to study its dynamic optimization in large-population setting. Indeed, the dynamic optimization of backward large populationtence. At last, the related approximate Nash equilibrium property is also established. The MFG strategy derived is an open-loop manner. Consequently, the approximate Nash equilibrium property is verified under the open-loop strategies perturbation and some estimates of forward-backward SDE are involved. In addition, all agents are set to be statistically identical thus the limiting control problem and fixed-point arguments are given for a representative agent.
In order to make our paper more accessible to the reader, we provide the standard procedure of MFG, and describe our result mainly consisting of the following steps:
Step 1 : Fix the state-average limit: lim N →+∞ x (N ) and by lim N →+∞ y (N ) a frozen process Ex and Ey (the law of large numbers) and formulate an auxiliary stochastic control problem for A i which is parameterized by Ex and Ey. Note that the coupled Hamiltonian systems admits a unique strong adapted solution.
Step 2: Solve the above auxiliary stochastic control problem via Pontryagin's maximum principle to obtain the decentralized optimal state x i, * t , y i, * t , z i, * t , (which should depend on the undetermined processes Ex and Ey). By means of convex analysis, we are able to construct the unique feedback control using a so-called projection mapping, ϕ (t, p, q, k) .
Step 3: Characterize the decentralized strategies {ū i t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } of Problem (CC) through the auxiliary (LCC) and consistency condition system. Namely, show {ū i t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. This step actually can be further divided into:
Step 3-1: Introduce the decentralized state x i t ,y i ,z i , with its decentralized openloop optimal strategy ϕ χ i , β i , γ i and the consistency conditions systems. We get two estimations between them in Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, respectively;
Step 3-2: For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we shall consider a group of state equations x i ,ỹ i ,z i driven by certain perturbation control u i ∈ U d,i ad and systems x i ,ẙ i ,z i of the decentralized limiting state with perturbation control. Similarly, we have the estimations between perturbation systems and consistency condition system in Lemma 10, plus the estimations between perturbation systems and decentralized limiting state with perturbation control system in Lemma 11;
Step 3-3: Finally, based on Lemma 7-Lemma 11, employing the relation between limiting cost functional J i and the cost functional J i of A i with help of perturbational control, we are able to get our desired result. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates the LQ MFGs of BSDEs type with convex control domain. The decentralized strategies are derived with the help of a mean field forward-backward SDEs with projection operators. The consistency condition is also established. Section 3 verifies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the decentralized strategies. Some proofs will be scheduled in Appendix A. Related results on properties of projection in convex analysis can be found in Appendix B.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we denote the k-dimensional Euclidean space by R k with standard Euclidean norm | · | and standard Euclidean inner product ·, · . The transpose of a vector (or matrix) x is denoted by x T . Tr(A) denotes the trace of a square matrix A. Let R m×n be the Hilbert space consisting of all (m × n)-matrices with the inner product A, B := Tr(AB ⊤ ) and the norm |A| := A, A 1 2 . Denote the set of symmetric k×k matrices with real elements by
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for fixed T > 0. We assume (Ω, F, {F t } 0≤t≤T , P ) is a complete, filtered probability space on which a standard N -dimensional Brownian
Now let us consider a large-population system with N weakly-coupled negligible agents {A i } 1≤i≤N . The state x i and y i for each A i satisfies the following controlled linear stochastic system:
where
M, N, H, V, U, K, f, Φ) are matrix-valued functions with appropriate dimensions to be identified. For sake of presentation, we set all agents are homogeneous or statistically symmetric with same coefficients (A, B, F, b, D, σ, M, U, H, V, U, K, f, Φ) and deterministic initial states x. Now we identify the information structure of large population system: F i = {F i t } 0≤t≤T is the natural filtration generated by {W i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T } and augmented by all P −null sets in F. F = {F t } 0≤t≤T is the natural filtration generated by {W i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 0 ≤ t ≤ T } and augmented by all P −null sets in F. Thus, F i is the individual decentralized information of i th Brownian motion while F is the centralized information driven by all Brownian motion components. Note that the heterogeneous noise W i is specific for individual agent A i but x i (t) is adapted to F t instead of F i t due to the coupling state-average x (N ) . The (centralized) admissible control u i ∈ U c ad where the (centralized) admissible control set U c ad is defined as U
Typical examples of such set is U = R m + which represents the positive control. By "centralized", we mean F is the centralized information generated by all Brownian motion components. Moreover, we also define decentralized control as u i ∈ U d,i ad , where the decentralized admissible control set U 
We assume the followng conditions:
By virtue of the theory of mean field BSDEs (see Lemma 3.1 in [5] ), under the assumptions (A1)-(A2), Eq. (1) admits a unique solution
We now formulate the large population LQG with control constraint (CC).
Problem (CC).
Find an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies setū
, the strategies of all agents except A i .
Observe that the problem (CC) is of large computational issue since the highlycomplicated coupling structure among these agents. Alternatively, the mean-field game theory employed is to search the approximate Nash equilibrium, which bridges the "centralized" LQG to the limiting LQG control problems, as the number of agents tends to infinity. Similar in [24] , we need to construct some auxiliary control problem using the frozen state-average limit. Based on it, we can find the decentralized strategies by consistency condition.
Let us introduce the following auxiliary problem for
with the limiting cost functional given by
where φ i , i = 1, 2 are the average limit of realized states which should be determined by the consistency-condition (CC) in our later analysis (see (10)). Note that the auxiliary state
is different to the true state x i , y i , z i . Also, the admissible control
ad whereas in (1), (2), the admissible control ∈ U c ad (for sake of simplicity, we still denote them with the same notation). Now we formulate the following limiting stochastic optimal control problem with control constraint (LCC).
Problem (LCC). For the i th agent,
ad satisfying
Then u i, * (·) is called a decentralized optimal control for Problem (LCC). Now we apply the well known maximum principle (Theorem 3.3 in [43] ) to characterize u i, * with the optimal state x i, * . To this end, let us introduce the following adjoint process
The Hamiltonian function can be expressed by
Since U is a closed convex set, then maximum principle reads as the following local form
(6) Hereafter, time argument is suppressed in case when no confusion occurs. Noticing (5), then (6) yields that
or equivalently (noticing R > 0),
for all u ∈ U, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] , P -a.s. As R > 0, we take the following norm on U ⊂ R m (which is equivalent to its Euclidean norm)
x , and by the well-known results of convex analysis, we obtain that (7) is equivalent to
where P U (·) is the projection mapping from R m to its closed convex subset Γ under the norm · R . For more details, see Appendix. Hereafter, denote
Here, for simplicity, the dependence of ϕ on time variable t is suppressed. The related Hamiltonian system becomes
After above preparations, it follows that
Here, the first equality of (8) and (9) is due to the consistency condition: the frozen term φ 1 and φ 2 should equal to the average limit of all realized states x i, * , y i, * ; the second equality is due to the law of large numbers. Thus, by replacing φ 1 , φ 2 by Ex i, * , Ey i, * in above Hamiltonian system, we get the following system
Clearly, all agents are statistically identical, therefore we can suppress subscript "i" and the following consistency condition system appears for generic agent:
Here, W stands for a generic Brownian motion on (Ω, F, P ), and denote F W the natural filtration generated by it and augmented by all null-sets.
before. The system (10) is a nonlinear mean-field forwardbackward SDE (MF-FBSDE) with projection operator. It characterizes the state-average limit φ 1 = Ex, φ 2 = Ey and MFG strategiesū i = ϕ(p, q, k) for a generic agent in the combined manner, which is totally different from [24, 25] . As you may concern, we need to prove the above consistency condition system admits a unique solution. We have the following uniqueness and existence result. Remark 1. It is necessary to point out that there should put a term y
But we claim that after taking expectation, it will disappear. Indeed, according to (7) , the second one is because of the law of large numbers, whilst the last one is due to the fact that y i, * 0 is an F i 0 -measurable random vector; and therefore is deterministic. Apparently, in contrast to Huang et al. [24, 25] , our framework involves the state x i , y i . Theorem 2. Assume that (A1) and (A2) are in force. There exists a unique adapted
For simplicity, we put the proof of Theorem 2 in the Appendix A.
Main result
In above sections, we can characterize the decentralized strategies {ū i t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } of Problem (CC) through the auxiliary (LCC) and consistency condition system. For sake of presentation, we alter the notation of consistency condition system to be
Now, we are in position to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of them. To this end, let us first present the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3. A set of strategies,ū i t ∈ U c ad , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , for N agents, is called to satisfy an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to costs
when any alternative strategy u i ∈ U c ad is applied by A i .
Remark 4. If ǫ = 0, then Definition 3 is reduced to the usual exact Nash equilibrium. Now, we give the main result of this paper and its proof will be shown step by step.
Theorem 5. Assume that (A1) and (A2) are in force. Then, (ū 1 ,ū 2 , · · · ,ū N ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC).
In order to prove the main Theorem 5, we needs several lemmas which are presented later. For agent A i , recall that its decentralized open-loop optimal strategy is
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the monotonic fully coupled FBSDEs (11) has a unique so-
Thus, the system of all first equation of (13), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , has also a unique solution (
is N -dimensional Brownian motions whose components are independent and identically distributed, we have (α i , β i , γ i , θ i , κ i , γ i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are independent and identically distributed.
Lemma 6. If (A1) and (A2) hold, then
The proof of Lemma 6 is classical by virtue of B-D-G inequality and Schwarz inequality, so we omit it.
Lemma 7. If (A1) and (A2) hold, then
E sup
Proof. Let us add up both sides of the first and second equation of (13) with respect to all 1 ≤ i ≤ N and multiply
On the other hand, by taking the expectation on both sides of the second equation of (13), it follows from Fubini's theorem that Eα i satisfies the following equation:
From (16) and (17), by denoting
we have
and the inequality (x + y) 2 ≤ 2x 2 + 2y 2 yields that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
From the well-known Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the B-D-G inequality, we obtain that there exists a constant C 0 independent of N (which may vary line by line) such that
Since (χ i , β i , γ i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are independent identically distributed, for each fixed s ∈ [0, T ], let us denote that µ(s) = Eϕ(χ i , β i , γ i )) (note that µ does not depend on i), we have
Since (χ i , β i , γ i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are independent, we have
Then, due to the fact that (χ i , β i , γ i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are identically distributed, there exists a constant C 0 independent of N such that
where the last equality comes from the fact that ϕ(χ i , β i , γ i ) ∈ L 2 F i (0, T ; Γ). We proceed the second term of (20) , using the fact that (χ i , β i , γ i ) are identically distributed as follows:
Moreover, we obtain from (20) that
Consequently, by virtue of Gronwall's inequality, we get the first estimate (18) . We now handle the estimates (19) . Applying Itô's formula again, we have
Using B-D-G inequalities, we show that there exists a constant C 1 , modifying C 1 if necessary,
.
Employing the classical Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Gronwall's inequality with estimation (14), we get (15).
Lemma 8.
Assume that (A1) and (A2) are in force. Then, we have
Proof. From (13) and (11), we have that
where (β i , χ i , γ i ) is the unique solution to the following FBSDEs:
The classical estimate for the SDE yields that
where C 0 is a constant independent of N . Noticing (14) of Lemma 7, we obtain (21). We consider
By classical estimation for BSDE, we have
where C 0 is a constant independent of N . By Gronwall's inequality, we get the desired result.
Lemma 9. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
Proof. From the definition of (2), (4) and (13), we have
. (24) We will use the following
and Lemma 7, Lemma 8 as well as E sup 0≤t≤T α i (t) 2 ≤ C 0 , for some constant C 0 independent of N which may vary line by line in the following, we have
With similar argument, using (15) and (22), one can show that
The proof is completed by noticing (24) . We will prove the control strategies set (ū 1 ,ū 2 , . . . ,ū N ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for Problem (CC)
i . The wellposedness of above system is easily to obtain. To prove (ū 1 ,ū 2 , . . . ,ū N ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, we can show that for
Then we only need to consider the perturbation u i ∈ U
which implies that
where C 0 is a constant independent of N . Now, for the i th agent, we consider the perturbation in the Problem (LCC). We introduce the following system of the decentralized limiting state with perturbation control (j = i):
We have the following results:
Lemma 10. Let (A1) and (A2) hold, then
Proof. By (25), we get
Let us denote
and recall (17) which is
By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality as well as the B-D-G inequality, we obtain that there exists a constant C 0 independent of N which may vary line by line such that, for any
On the one hand, by denoting µ(s) := Eϕ(χ j , β j , γ j ) (note that since (χ j , β j , γ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N , j = i, are independent identically distributed, thus µ is independent of j), we have
Then, due to the fact that
, similarly to Lemma 7 we can obtain that there exists a constant C 0 independent of N such that
In addition, due to (26), we get
and similarly, since (χ j , β j , γ j ), 1 ≤ j ≤ N , j = i, are identically distributed, we have
Therefore, from above estimates, we get from (31) that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
Finally, by using Gronwall's inequality, we get (28) . We now proceed the second inequality. Applying Itô's formula again, we have
Still using B-D-G inequalities, we show that there exists a constant C 2 , modifying C 2 if necessary,
By employing the classical Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Gronwall's inequality, we obtain get (29) .
Proof. From respectively the first equation of (25) and (27), we obtain
With the help of classical estimates of SDE and BSDE, Gronwall's inequality and (28) and (29) of Lemma 10, it is easily to obtain (32) and (33) . The proof is completed.
Lemma 12. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N, for the perturbation control u i , we have
Proof. Recall (2), (4), (8), and (9), we have
Using Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 as well as E sup 0≤t≤T |ȳ i (t)| 2 + |α i (t)| 2 ≤ C 0 , for some constant C independent of N which may vary line by line in the following, we have
With similar argument, we can show that
Hence, we get the desired result. Proof of Theorem 5: Now, we consider the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for A i for Problem (CC). Combining Lemma 9 and Lemma 12, we have
Consequently, Theorem 5 holds with
A Proof of theorem
Proof of Theorem 2. (Uniqueness) Suppose that there exists two solutions:
and denotê
witĥ
Taking the expectation in the second equation of (34) yields Ep = 0. Applying Itô's formula to q,x − p,ŷ and taking expectations on both sides (also, noting Ep = 0, which derives that Eq = 0, and the monotonicity property of ϕ), we arrive at
Thus, G x T − Ex T = 0, Q x − Ex = 0, and L (ŷ s − Eŷ s ) = 0 which according to the uniqueness and existences of classical BSDE theory impliesp s ≡ 0,q s ≡ 0. Next, we have ϕ(p,q,k) ≡ 0 which further implies Ex s ≡ 0, hencex s ≡ 0. Moreover,ŷ T = 0 yields, by Theorem 3.1 in [6] ,ŷ = 0. Hence the uniqueness follows.
In order to prove the existence for FBSDE (10), we need the following result. It involves a priori estimates of solutions of the following family of mean fields FBSDEs parameterized by α ∈ [0, 1].
Before that, we denote
Consider the following a family of FBSDEs with parameter α ∈ R,
, and υ (ξ) is a Rvalued (R n -valued) square integrable random varible which is F W T -measurable. Note the coefficient Ξ U p − L (y − Ey) . It is easy to check Ep α = 0, then by uniqueness of BSDE, Eq α = 0. Specifically, letting α = 0, one immediately has                    dx = b 0 dt + σ 0 dW t , dy = (γ 0 − Eγ 0 ) dt + zdW t , dp = λ 0 dt, dq = (ψ 0 − Eψ 0 ) dt + kdW t , x α 0 = x ∈ R n , y α T = υ − Eυ, p α 0 = ς − Eς, q α T = ξ − Eξ.
Obviously, (36) is kind of decoupled FBSDEs whose solvability is trivial.
Lemma 13. Assume that (A1) and (A2) are in force, there exists a positive constant δ 0 ∈ [0, 1], such that if, a priori, for some α 0 ∈ [0, 1), for each x 0 ∈ R n , (b 0 , σ 0 , γ 0 , λ 0 , µ 0 , ψ 0 ) ∈ L 2 F W (0, T ; R n × R n × R n × R n × R n × R n ), mean field FBSDEs (35) have a unique adapted solution in L 2 F W (0, T ; R n × R n × R n × R n × R n × R n ), then for each δ ∈ [α 0 , α 0 + δ 0 ], for each x 0 ∈ R n , (b 0 , σ 0 , γ 0 , λ 0 , µ 0 , ψ 0 ) ∈ L 2 F W (0, T ; R n × R n × R n × R n × R n × R n ), Eq. (35) also have a unique solution in L 2 F W (0, T ; R n × R n × R n × R n × R n × R n ).
Proof. Define
We set x 0 , Ex 0 , y 0 , Ey 0 , z 0 , p 0 , q 0 , k 0 = 0, and solve iteratively the following equations: dx i+1 = αB x i+1 , Ex i+1 , p i+1 , q i+1 , k i+1 + δB x i , Ex i , p i , q i , k i + b 0 dt + αΣ p i+1 , q i+1 , k i+1 + δΣ p i , q i , k i + σ 0 dW t , dy i+1 = αF x i+1 , Ex i+1 , y i+1 , Ey i+1 , p i+1 , q i+1 , k i+1 +δF x i , Ex i , y i , Ey i , p i , q i , k i + γ − Eγ dt + z i+1 dW t , dp i+1 = αΞ y i+1 , Ey i+1 , p i+1 + δΞ y i , Ey i , p i + λ 0 − Eλ 0 dt dq i+1 = αΥ x i+1 , Ex i+1 , p i+1 , q i+1 + δΥ x i , Ex i , p i , q i +ψ 0 − Eψ 0 dt + k i+1 dW t , x 0 = x ∈ R n , y 
We setx
B Properties of projection
We recall the following properties of projection P U onto a closed convex set U , see [9] , Chapter 5.
Theorem 14. For a nonempty closed convex set U ⊂ R m , for every x ∈ R m , there exists a unique x * ∈ U , such that |x − x * | = min y∈Γ |x − y| =: dist(x, U ).
Moreover, x * is characterized by the property x * ∈ U, x * − x, x * − y ≤ 0 ∀y ∈ U.
The above element x * is called the projection of x onto U and is denoted by P U [x].
One can immediately obtain the following Proposition 15. Let U ⊂ R m be a nonempty closed convex set, then we have
Proposition 16. Let U ⊂ R m be a nonempty closed convex set, then the projection P U does not increase the distance, i.e.
Now let us consider R m and the projection P U both with the norm · R 0 := R The proofs of Proposition 15-Proposition 17 can be found in [7, 9] . Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
